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Jolson: The Power of Suggestion

THE POWER OF SUGGESTION:
CAN A JUDICIAL STANDING ORDER DISRUPT A NORM?
Kimberly A. Jolson*

Visualize a judge. Is she donning a black robe? Is she sitting on the
bench in her courtroom? Is she rendering her decision in an important
case?
Historically, the study of the judicial role has been almost universally
centered on this sort of “in-court” behavior. And rightly so. The top
judicial function is to adjudicate disputes. But that is not all they do.
Increasingly, attention is being paid to judges’ extrajudicial expressions
or their messaging. One very important way in which judges express
preferences—and, at times, requirements—concerning how cases
proceed before them is through judicial standing orders. Standing orders
range from the mundane, like page limits for briefs, 1 to the extraordinary,
like offering sentencing credit to inmates in exchange for their
sterilization.2 The proliferation of standing orders cannot be overstated.
They have become a fixture in nearly every courthouse across the country.
Yet, they remain under the radar. Indeed, little case law has developed
regarding their boundaries, and even less has been done to study their
effects.
This Article considers the impact, if any, of a particular judicial
standing order that encourages behavior by simply expressing a
preference. The results of the study have implications for how judges
themselves should think about their standing orders and how we all
understand judicial power.
And, even more generally, this Article presents the question of whether
the bald expression of a judicial preference can disrupt a norm. For
decades, legal scholars like Cass Sunstein, Lawrence Lessig, and Richard
McAdams all—in their own ways—have argued that law has an
expressive function and, through that expression, law has power.3 Over
* United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Ohio. This Article, in its original form, was
submitted as a requirement for the degree of Masters of Law in Judicial Studies at Duke University. I
thank my advisor, Professor Mitu Gulati, for his guidance and inspiration. I also thank Matt Jolson for
his consummate support and fortuitous understanding of statistics.
1. See, e.g., Judge Eric F. Melgren, United States District Court for the District of Kansas,
Standing Order regarding page Limitations for Memorandums and Briefs, available at
http://ksd.uscourts.gov/index.php/guideline-order/standing-order-regarding-page-limitations-formemorandums-and-briefs-melgren/ (last visited July 31, 2019).
2. Colin Dwyer, Judge Promises Reduced Jail Time if Tennessee Inmates Get Vasectomies, NPR
(Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/21/538598008/judge-promisesreduced-jail-time-if-tennessee-inmates-get-vasectomies.
3. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 673 (1998);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Richard H. McAdams,
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twenty years ago, Sunstein posited that norms, defined as “social attitudes
of approval or disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what
ought not to be done,” can be government managed. In support, he
declared that laws “make a statement about how much, and how, a good
or bad should be valued[.]” More recently, McAdams built upon this
work and deeply analyzed two of law’s expressive powers: the ability to
coordinate and to inform, which, McAdams asserts, supplements law’s
force.4 As this Article will show, judicial standing orders are a useful tool
to analyze these concepts.
This Article proceeds as follows. To begin, Section I reviews norm
literature at a very high level and explains the norm of sending more
senior lawyers to court. Section II gives to an overview of what standing
orders are and how they operate. This section also summarizes the
relatively sparse case law governing standing orders and explores the
legal limits judges face in enforcing standing orders.
Section III provides the background of the particular standing order
under study. Recently, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) resolved
to urge courts to implement plans that welcome opportunities for newer
lawyers in the courtroom.5 Section III provides this history and also offers
examples of the different standing orders at work in this area.
Importantly, Section III notes the feeling, at least among some judges,
that the bench has a responsibility to ensure that the younger generation
of lawyers is ready to lead. This Section lays the groundwork for the
question of whether a court’s practices impact party choices and lawyer
behavior—an important concept this Article seeks to study. At a more
granular level, this Section identifies and compares four types of newlawyer participation standing orders: (1) a standing order that simply
encourages new-lawyer participation;6 (2) one that makes opportunities
available for new lawyers because the judge hears arguments when she
otherwise wouldn’t;7 (3) a
hybrid—it encourages new-lawyer
participation and also notes a willingness to hear from more than one
lawyer if that enhances new-lawyer participation;8 and (4) an ad hoc
An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR . L. REV. 1 (2000); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW 1 (1991).
4. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 4-5 (2015).
5. A.B.A. Resolution 116 (adopted August 14-15, 2017).
6. McAdams, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Judge Christopher Burke, United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
Standing Order Regarding Courtroom Opportunities for Newer Attorneys (Jan. 23, 2016), available at
https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/ded/files/StandingOrder2017.pdf.
8. Judge Gray H. Miller, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Court
Procedures
(Sept.
16,
2015),
available
at
https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/procedures%20with%20att%20forms.pdf(“In those instances
where the court is inclined to rule on the papers, a representation that the argument would be handled by
a young lawyer will weigh in favor of holding a hearing.”).
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approach whereby a judge, in a particular case, makes her expectation
clear that less-experienced lawyers will be seen and heard in the
courtroom.9 Relying on Section II’s analysis, Section III explores
potential legal concerns of the different variations of the standing orders.10
Most critically, it explains why an order encouraging, rather than
mandating, is preferable under current case law and why it is useful for
studying the broader question of societal compliance. It is also a way to
examine law’s expressive powers.
Section IV is the heart of the Article. It examines the effects of the
order that simply encourages participation. The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts is noteworthy because more than
half of the active District Judges have implemented the standing order
encouraging new-lawyer participation. I have collected six data sets. The
first two sets are a comparison of the experience level of lawyers
appearing at initial scheduling conferences during the six months before
and the sixth months after implementation of the order by two District
Judges. The next data set is a comparison of the experience level of
lawyers appearing before a District Judge to argue civil motions during
the six months before and the six months after implementation of the
standing order. The next three data sets include data about the lawyers
appearing before these District Judges for the first half of 2019.
Section V summarizes the findings, makes suggestions for how to craft
standing orders, and advocates for more study.
II. NORMS AND COURTROOM PARTICIPATION
Precisely defining a “norm”—what it is and whether it exists—is
perilous business. Thoughtful scholars have offered related definitions,
but most would agree with McAdams’s description that norms are
“informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-

9. See, e.g., In re Generic Digoxin and Doxycycline Antitrust Litig.222 F. Supp. 3d 1341
(J.P.M.L. 2017), (noting, in a price-fixing multidistrict litigation, that “the Court expect[ed] that the
leadership [would] provide opportunities for attorneys not named to the PSC, particularly less-senior
attorneys, to participa[te] meaningfully and efficiently in the MDL, including through participation in any
committees within the [Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] and in determining which counsel will argue any
motions before the Court.”); see also Case Specific Order Re: Oral Argument, GSI Technology Inc. v.
United Memories, Inc., Case No. 5:13-cv-01081-PSG(Mar. 9, 2016) (“[T]he court expects that each party
will allow associates to present its arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard. If any party
elects not to do this, the court will take its positions on all six motions on the papers and without oral
argument.”).
10. Some of the criticism of the orders relates to the use of the orders to increase women and
minority participation in courtroom. Although an interesting issue, this paper does not explore those
questions.
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legal sanctions, or both.”11 For his part, Lawrence Lessig has explained
that norms “regulate”: They “frown on the racist’s joke,” “they tell the
stranger to tip a waiter at a highway diner,” and they “constrain” behavior
“not through the centralized enforcement of a state,” but “because of the
enforcement of a community.” In other words, norms lean on people to
behave in a certain way, and the thread among this scholarship is that a
norm is more than just a behavioral regularity—a norm brings with it a
sense of what ought to be done.
For the past half-century, legal scholars have explored norms in
numerous and disparate contexts. Robert Ellickson (now) famously
studied Shasta County ranchers’ informal dispute resolution process.12
Cass Sunstein and others investigated the dueling culture of early
America,13 and Mark West delved into the informal structures governing
sumo wrestling in Japan.14 As part of this field of study, scholars also ask
how norms change. Sunstein has observed that criticism plays an
important role in norm change, and opinion leaders who aim to shape
norms—whom he calls “norm entrepreneurs”—can bring about sudden
change.15
This leads to the question this Article presents. The expectation
that the wet-behind-the ears lawyer is not the one standing up in court—
especially federal court—fits many of the definitions of a norm. This is
so not only because it is what regularly happens, but also because it is
what people believe ought to happen. Indeed, it is expected that the grayhaired lawyer addresses the judge and argues the case. Can a judicial
standing order that baldly expresses a preference, without threat of
sanction, lead to norm change in this space? In Sunstein’s words, can
judges act as “norm entrepreneurs” via their standing orders and effect
change?
II. UNDERSTANDING STANDING ORDERS
To appreciate whether standing orders have the ability to disrupt a
norm—and whether the particular standing order under study in fact
did—a few words about standing orders are first needed.

11. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 340 (1997) (offering this definition as a coalescence of the new school thought).
12. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 623 (1986).
13. C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in
Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805 (2001).
14. See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
15. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 909.
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A. Case Law
Although case law explaining the boundaries of standing orders in the
federal system is relatively light, certain themes have emerged. First and
foremost, standing orders (both by the district and by an individual judge)
can be an appropriate exercise of a court’s inherent authority over
management of its cases and control of the courtroom.16 In United States
v. Ray, the United States argued that a standing order requiring the U.S.
Attorney to assemble information required by the PROTECT Act to be
submitted to the Sentencing Commission contravened Congress’ intent
under the statute and exceeded the district court’s authority.17 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed. The Court found the standing order in line with the
relevant statute but additionally concluded that the court’s power derived
from its “inherent authority to regulate the practice of litigants before it,”
which permitted the court to implement the standing order.18
Despite this inherent authority, standing orders may be found improper
if they are inconsistent with statutes or the national rules, like federal
procedural rules. The Second Circuit’s decision in Commercial Cleaning
Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Servo Systems, Inc., provides an example of a
standing order that, according to the Second Circuit, went too far.19 The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut had adopted a
standing order requiring a plaintiff in a RICO action to submit a case
statement within 20 days of bringing the action. The case statement was
to provide “in detail information” like “the names of the individuals,
partnerships, or other legal entities constituting the RICO enterprise, the
dates of the predicate acts with a description of the facts surrounding the
predicate acts, and the identity of the alleged wrongdoers and victims.”20
The district court had relied on this standing order, at least in part, to
dismiss the plaintiff’s RICO claims because the plaintiff provided
“insufficient information.”21 The Second Circuit found this troubling:
We consider first the theory of insufficient information. For at least two
reasons, dismissal for insufficient information was not justified. First, the
Standing Order calls for information far in excess of the essential

16. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding standing order
requiring U.S. Attorney to assemble information required by PROTECT Act to be submitted to the
Sentencing Commission was upheld as a proper exercise of “the court’s inherent authority to regulate the
practice of litigants before it”).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 993. (“Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent
power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.”
(citing In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920))).
19. 271 F.3d 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. Id. at 385.
21. Id.
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elements of a RICO claim. On a motion for summary judgment, or for
judgment as a matter of law at the time of trial, a defendant would not be
entitled to judgment because the plaintiff's evidence failed to include all
the “individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or other legal
entities [that constitute] the RICO enterprise,” or the identities of all
“wrongdoers” and “victims.” To the extent the Standing Order called for
presentation of information going beyond what a plaintiff needs to present
to establish a legally sufficient case, plaintiff's inability to produce it could
not justify the grant of judgment to defendant.
A standing order of this nature may appropriately require a plaintiff to
set forth the information it possesses in helpfully categorized form, as an
aide to the court and to the accused defendant. But it may not make the
prosecution of the action dependent on the plaintiff's ability to furnish
more information than is required, as a matter of law, to prove the
essential elements of the claim. 22
As an aside, the Second Circuit went on to criticize the district court
for disallowing discovery.23 But, important for this Article’s purposes,
the Second Circuit was clear that a judicial officer cannot use a standing
order to expand substantive legal requirements beyond what the law
requires.
In addition, courts have expressed concern about the lack of notice and
public participation in the implementation of standing orders.24 This
concern is unsurprising. Of course, fairness requires litigants to know the
rules governing them. And a preference for a notice-and-comment period
allows for feedback.
Relatedly, standing orders may go a step too far if they impose
inflexible standards that do not accommodate the particular needs of a
case. The First Circuit addressed this issue in In re Fidelity/Micron
Securities Litigation, concluding that the district court's standing order on
allocation of costs “raises a core concern: it does not leave sufficient room
for individualized consideration of expense requests.” In that matter, the
First Circuit considered a standing order stating that, as a matter of
practice, prohibited reimbursement of certain categories of expenses
absent “exceptional circumstances.”25 The First Circuit concluded that
the standing order raised a “core concern” that it did not leave “sufficient

22. Id. at 385-86; see also United States v. Zingsheim, 384 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2004)
(application of standing order found to be improper because it was used to defer downward departure
decisions when deferral was not authorized by Rule 35).
23. Id. at 386.
24. See, e.g., In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 167 F.3d 735, 737 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e
urge the district courts to avoid incipient problems of this type by incorporating standing orders into local
rules, or, at least, making them readily available in the office of the Clerk of the district court.”).
25. Id. at 736.
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room for individualized consideration of expense requests.”26
In sum, standing orders can be a permissible exercise of a court’s
inherent authority over the management of its docket and courtroom. But,
predictably, standing orders that conflict with national rules or statutes are
frowned upon. Similarly, the ways in which standing orders are adopted
and implemented matter. Most importantly, notice to litigants is required,
and a comment period is preferable.
B. Standing Orders In Context
Given these procedural and substantive limitations, standing orders
occupy a unique space within the law—especially the type of standing
order this Article studies. Here’s why. As McAdams concisely
summarizes, the two conventional accounts of legal compliance are
deterrence and legitimacy.27 The first account, which economists tend to
favor, holds that legal sanctions change the cost of behavior by making
compliance cheaper than noncompliance.28 The second account is
legitimacy.29 In short, people are more likely to obey the law when the
law is viewed as a legitimate moral authority. 30 The law’s legitimacy is
particularly important in the absence of a moral consensus. When that is
the case, law might be able to leverage its legitimacy to persuade the
public to change their moral view, and, in turn, their behavior. 31
Although McAdams gives these accounts their due, he posits that while
sanctions and legitimacy generate most of legal compliance, these
theories cannot explain everything. McAdams’ concern is the rest. He
theorizes that “law has expressive powers independent of the legal
sanctions threatened on violators and independent of the legitimacy the
population perceives in the authority creating and enforcing the law.” 32
He identifies two expressive mechanisms, coordination and information,
which round out law’s causal powers.33 First, the law coordinates
behavior by making a particular outcome salient.34 Borrowing from game
theory, McAdams calls this the “coordinating focal point” for behavior. 35
Second, law reveals information. In McAdams’ words, law has
informational content that reflects the values of the laws’ creators. “These
26. Id. at 737.
27. McAdams supra note 4, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6–7 (italics omitted).
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id.
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new beliefs can change an individual’s behavior, usually in the direction
of greater compliance, though sometimes less compliance and sometimes
in ways orthogonal to compliance. In short, law provides information;
information changes beliefs; new beliefs change behavior.” 36 These
expressive mechanisms explain laws’ ability to spur compliance when
deterrence and legitimacy fail to account for it all. As an example,
McAdams turns to “tribunals successfully resolving disputes despite
lacking any power to sanction the disputing parties.”37 To demonstrate
this, McAdams and Tom Ginsburg have studied compliance rates with
International Court of Justice decisions.38 Even without the ability to
sanction noncompliance, ICJ decisions enjoy prompt compliance sixtyeight percent of the time.39
Back to standing orders. As explained above, judges are limited in how
far they can reach with standing orders. Judges’ ability to sanction
noncompliance is limited—if not completely curtailed—in certain
instances. So when judges foray into areas over which they have little
power, they must rely on other forces to induce compliance. And while
the judiciary generally is seen as legitimate, 40 its legitimacy is shakier
when it acts beyond its authority. One, hopefully extreme, example will
suffice. When Judge Sam Benningfield, a Tennessee general sessions
judge for White County, Tennessee, issued a standing order offering
reduced drug sentences to defendants in exchange for agreeing to longterm contraception, he received nearly universal criticism. The local
district attorney, calling the long-term contraception decision “personal
in nature,” said that those decisions are “something the court system
should not encourage or mandate.”41 A spokesperson for the American
Civil Liberties Union stated “judges play an important role in our
community—overseeing individuals’ childbearing capacity should not be
part of that role.”42 In other words, many stakeholders viewed the
standing order as illegitimate. Given this, judges’ legitimacy is at a low
point when judges adopt standing orders that are seen as beyond their
realm of authority. As such, legitimacy alone cannot explain why
compliance occurs when judges issue standing orders that reach beyond
their power to enforce.
One final point. The theory of laws’ expressive powers as causal
36. Id. at 136 (italics omitted).
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 91, 120–21.
39. Id. at 91.
40. This of course is not always true. See, e.g., Sheriff Joe Arpaio guilty of contempt for ignoring
order to stop racial profiling, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jul/31/joe-arpaio-convicted-contempt-immigration-patrols.
41. Dwyer, supra note 2.
42. Id.
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mechanisms are not set up to displace deterrence and legitimacy.
McAdams instead advocated “theoretical pluralism” about compliance. 43
It is from this view that the paper proceeds. The paper seeks to answer
whether laws’ expressive powers of coordination and information might
explain, in part, compliance with standing orders.
C. Will the Junior Lawyer Please Stand Up?:
Attempts to Disrupt a Norm
As noted, the ABA resolved to urge courts, specifically judges, to
implement plans that welcome opportunities for newer lawyers in the
courtroom.44 The resolution notes that “[i]n light of the diminishing
opportunities available for newer lawyers to develop their litigation skills
in a courtroom setting,” the ABA “support[s] the proper development of
the future generation of lawyers.”45 To that end, the ABA has called upon
stakeholders to take action. With respect to the judiciary, the resolution
expressly identifies judicial standing orders that promote newer lawyers’
active involvement in litigation and, more specifically, in the courtroom.46
The ABA’s resolution was years in the making. Beginning over a
decade ago, several judges around the country began adopting some
version of a “Young Lawyers in the Courtroom Program.” In the past
couple of years, more and more judges have adopted such orders.47 At
least among some judges, there is a feeling that the bench has a
responsibility to ensure that the younger generation of lawyers is ready to
lead.48 The Honorable Rebecca Pallmeyer perhaps described this
sentiment best:
There’s a general feeling on the bench that getting young lawyers
comfortable and active in court is part of our responsibility. Our first goal
always is to do justice, and whether that means granting a summary
judgment motion or settlement, so be it. But we do recognize the need and
desirability of having an experienced trial bar, and that includes younger
lawyers to be bar leaders of the future.49

While they may not know it, the judges adopting these orders are
43. McAdams, supra note 4.
44. A.B.A. Resolution 116 (adopted August 14-15, 2017).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id.; Judge James Donato, United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Standing Order for Civil Cases before Judge James Donato (Jan. 5, 2017), available at
https://northerndistrictpracticeprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2017-01-05-Standing-OrderFor-Civil-Cases-Befo.pdf. .
48. Erin Coe, An Endangered Art: Can the Legal Industry Keep Trial Advocacy Alive?, LAW360
IN-DEPTH (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/899956.
49. Id.
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attempting to disrupt a norm. Specifically, the judges are trying to
redefine the role of junior lawyers. As Sunstein has said, “[o]ften law
tries to redefine roles.”50 In 1996, he provided the examples of the law
saying “that husbands may not rape their wives; that absent fathers owe
duties of support to their children; that disabled people have certain rights
of access to the workplace.”51 All of these measures,” Sunstein explains,
“can be seen as attempts to create new or better norms to define the
relevant roles.52 So too with judicial standing orders.
1. Types of Standing Orders to Encourage Junior-Lawyer Participation
The judicial standing orders targeting junior-lawyer participation take
many forms, but their purpose is the same: to encourage junior lawyers
(most often defined as having fewer than between four and seven years of
experience) to have opportunities to be heard in court. Although only
illustrative—and certainly not exhaustive—four different types of orders
are described below.
The first type makes opportunities available for new lawyers because
the judge is more amenable to hearing argument than she otherwise would
be.53 Judge Burke of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut adopted a standing order that shows how this works.
The Court notes the “growing trend” of “fewer cases going to trial” and
that, when they do, “there are generally fewer opportunities “in court for
speaking or ‘stand-up’ engagements.” The standing order goes on to state
that the issue is particularly acute for newer lawyers, defined as attorneys
practicing for seven years or less.” Because of the importance of “the
development of future generations of practitioners through courtroom
opportunities,” the standing order provides:
(1) After a motion is fully briefed, either as a part of a Request for Oral
Arguments, or in a separate Notice filed thereafter, a party may alert the
Court that, if argument is granted, it intends to have a newer attorney argue
the motion (or a portion of the motion).
(2) If such notice is provided, the Court will:
A. Grant the request for oral argument on the motion, if it is at all
practicable to do so.
B. Strongly consider allocating additional time for oral argument
beyond what the Court may otherwise have allocated, were a newer
attorney not arguing the motion.
C. Permit other more experienced counsel of record the ability to

50. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 923.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Burke supra note 7.
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provide some assistance to the newer attorney who is arguing the
motion, where appropriate during oral argument.54

Of note, Judge Burke’s standing order provides caveats. First, “[a]ll
attorneys, including newer attorneys, will be held to the highest
professional standards,” and they must be “adequately prepared and
thoroughly familiar with the factual record and the applicable law, and to
have a degree of authority commensurate with the proceeding.”55 Second,
the court notes that, at times, it may not be appropriate for a newer lawyer
to argue a motion, and the Court “draws no inference from a party's
decision not to have a newer attorney argue any particular motion before
the Court.”56 Third, the Court “will draw no inference about the
importance of a particular motion, or the merits of a party’s argument
regarding the motion, from the party’s decision to have (or not to have) a
newer attorney argue the motion.”57 Orders like Judge Burke’s confer a
benefit on the party for compliance, namely an increased chance to be
heard.
The second type of standing order states that a judge will change her
practices if a more junior lawyer participates in a case. For example, a
judge may encourage junior-lawyer participation through a willingness to
hear from more than one lawyer if that enhances junior-lawyer
participation.58 Judge William Alsup does just that by “relax[ing]” the
one-lawyer-per-witness rule “to allow young lawyers a chance to
perform.”59 Judge James Donato, Northern District of California, has a
standing order that states that he will “extend motion argument time” for
junior lawyers appearing before him. 60 Again, these types of standing
orders confer a benefit.
The third approach is case specific. The judge makes her expectation
clear, in a particular matter, that less-experienced lawyers will appear in
the courtroom.61 Judge Grewal took this option in GSI Technology Inc.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Miller, supra note 8.(“In those instances where the court is inclined to rule on the papers, a
representation that the argument would be handled by a young lawyer will weigh in favor of holding a
hearing.”).
59. Judge William Alsup, United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
Supplemental Order to Order Setting Initial Case Management Conference in Civil Cases Before Judge
William Alsup (Jan. 11, 2016), available at www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/192/JuryTrials1.pdf.
60. Donato, supra note 47.
61. See, e.g., In re Generic Digoxin and Doxycycline Antitrust Litig., 222 F. Supp. 3d 1341
(J.P.M.L. 2017), (noting, in a price-fixing multidistrict litigation, that “the Court expect[ed] that the
leadership [would] provide opportunities for attorneys not named to the PSC, particularly less-senior
attorneys, to participa[te] meaningfully and efficiently in the MDL, including through participation in any
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v. United Memories, Inc.62 In an entertaining order, he explained the
current state of affairs. “In a technology community like ours that prizes
youth—at times unfairly—there is one place where youth and
inexperience seemingly comes with a cost: the courtroom.” 63 Judge
Grewal then posed the question, “[W]ho will try the technology cases of
the future, when so few opportunities to develop courtroom skills
appear?”64 He decided to be part of the solution.65 Six post-trial motions
were set for argument at the point in the litigation, and Judge Grewal
“expect[ed] that each party [would] allow associates to present its
arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard.”66 Failure to do
so would forfeit the chance for oral argument.67 Said plainly, the parties
faced an adverse consequence for not allowing an associate to argue—
oral argument would be cancelled.68
The fourth and final example simply expresses a judge’s preference
that more junior lawyers appear. The order provides neither a carrot nor
a stick, but the judge “strongly encourages the participation of relatively
inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings. Such attorneys may
committees within the [Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] and in determining which counsel will argue any
motions before the Court).
62. Case Specific Order Re: Oral Argument, GSI Tech. Inc. v. United Memories, Inc., 5:13-cv01081-PSG (Mar. 9, 2016) (“[T]he court expects that each party will allow associates to present its
arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard. If any party elects not to do this, the court will
take its positions on all six motions on the papers and without oral argument.”).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting judicial promotion of junior-lawyer participation).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. This order has an interesting post-script. The parties forfeited argument—rather than
allow associates to argue—and stipulated to have the motions decided on the briefs. See Case Specific
Order Re: Parties’ Stipulation to Vacate Hearing, GSI Tech. Inc. v. United Memories, Inc., 5:13-cv01081-PSG (Mar. 11, 2016). Judge Gewal expressed his displeasure:
The day before last, I expressed my concerns about the lack of courtroom opportunities for law firm
associates in intellectual property cases like this one. Recognizing the court’s own important role in
encouraging clients and partners to give up the podium once in a while, I asked that each party give
associates the chance to argue just two of six motions set for hearing on Monday. This morning, the
parties and their counsel responded. But rather than confirm their commitment to this exercise, the parties
jointly stipulated simply to take all motions off calendar and submit them without any hearing. No
explanation was given; perhaps associate preparation and travel costs were the issue. In any event, once
again, another big intellectual property case will come and go, and the associates who toil on it will largely
do so without ever being heard. I appreciate that my order acknowledged the possibility that the parties
would decline this opportunity and simply submit their motions on the papers. But I would be remiss if I
did not observe the irony of another missed opportunity to invest in our profession’s future when two of
the motions originally noticed for hearing seek massive fees and costs. To be clear, GSI asks for
$6,810,686.69 in attorney’s fees, $1,828,553.07 in non-taxable costs and $337,300.86 in taxable costs,
while UMI asks for $6,694,562 in attorney’s fees, $648,166 in expenses and $302,579.70 in taxable costs.
That a few more dollars could not be spent is disappointing to me. My disappointment, however, is
unlikely to compare to the disappointment of the associates, who were deprived yet again of an
opportunity to argue in court.
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handle not only relatively routine matters (such as scheduling conferences
or discovery motions), but may also handle, where appropriate, more
complex matters (such as motions for summary judgment or the
examination of witnesses at trial).”69 This Article studies an order of this
sort. Interestingly, without sanction for noncompliance, we have a realworld test of whether expression is enough to disrupt a norm.
2. A Standing Order Without Teeth
As mentioned earlier, this Article studies the effect, if any, of a
particular standing order that expresses a judicial preference for
encouraging junior lawyer participation. As of this writing, over half of
the District Judges of the United States District for the District of
Massachusetts have adopted such an order, and the standing orders the
judges have adopted are nearly identical. Given this uniformity, the
District of Massachusetts was fertile ground to see if this standing order,
which baldly expresses a preference, has had any impact. Of note, the
studied standing order neither provides a benefit for compliance nor
threatens sanctions for noncompliance. Instead, it does the exact opposite
by making an appeal. It acknowledges the decline in courtroom
opportunities, recognizes the importance of developing future generations
of practitioners, and then calls upon counsel to join the court in
effectuating this important policy. 70 Thus, the order is unequivocal in
expressing a preference without sanctions for noncompliance. One of the
judges’ orders goes so far to say that she knows her “standing order is not
self-executing.”71 But the order reveals information about the judge’s
preference. In McAdams’ words, it signals an attitude. The basic claim
of the attitudinal model is that law reveals attitudes.72 And the standing
order used by these judges reveals their attitude about the experience level
of the lawyers whom they want to see appearing before them.
Turning to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, some background information is useful. The District’s
territorial jurisdiction includes the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with

69. Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Aug. 12, 2014),
available
at
https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/saylor/StandingOrderReCourtroomOppor_Bostonupdate.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Judge Indira Talwani, United States District Court for theDistrict of Massachusetts,
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Oct. 9, 2015),
available at https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/talwani.htm.
71. Judge Denise J. Casper, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (May 16, 2011),
available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/casper.htm.
72. McAdams, supra note 4.
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three seats of court: Boston, Springfield, and Worcester. Eleven active
District Judges serve the Court. Judge F. Dennis Saylor was one of the
first judges in the country to adopt an order addressing junior-lawyer
participation. He first did so in 2005 along with Magistrate Judge Charles
B. Smartwood. Then, on November 2, 2006, Judge Saylor along with
then-Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman adopted a “Standing Order
Regarding Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced
Attorneys.” The standing order provides in full:
Courtroom opportunities for relatively inexperienced attorneys,
particularly those who practice at larger firms, have declined precipitously
across the nation in recent years. That decline is due to a variety of factors,
but has been exacerbated by the proliferation of rules and orders requiring
the appearance of “lead” counsel in many court proceedings.
In an effort to counter that trend, the undersigned District Judge and
Magistrate Judge, as a matter of policy, strongly encourage the
participation of relatively inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings.
Such attorneys may handle not only relatively routine matters (such as
scheduling conferences or discovery motions), but may also handle, where
appropriate, more complex matters (such as motions for summary
judgment or the examination of witnesses at trial). The following cautions,
however, shall apply.
First, even relatively inexperienced attorneys will be held to the
highest professional standards with regard to any matter as to which
experience is largely irrelevant. In particular, all attorneys appearing in
court are expected to be appropriately prepared, regardless of experience.
For example, any attorney who is arguing a motion for summary judgment
is expected to be thoroughly familiar with the factual record and the
applicable law.
Second, all attorneys appearing in court should have a degree of
authority commensurate with the proceeding that they are assigned to
handle. For example, an attorney appearing at a scheduling conference
ordinarily should have the authority to propose and agree to a discovery
schedule and any other matters reasonably likely to arise at the conference.
Third, relatively inexperienced attorneys who seek to participate in
evidentiary hearings of substantial complexity, such as examining a
witness at trial, should be accompanied and supervised by a more
experienced attorney, unless leave of Court is granted otherwise. Counsel
are encouraged to seek additional guidance from the Court in particular
cases concerning the scope or application of this policy.

Other district judges in Massachusetts followed suit: Judge Denise J.
Casper on May 16, 2011;73 Judge Indira Talwani on October 9, 2015;74

73. Casper, supra note 71.
74. Talwani, supra note 70.
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Judge Leo T. Sorokin on March 15, 2017;75 and Judge Mark G.
Mastroianni on May 3, 2017. And, unsurprisingly, Judge Hillman
continued to use the standing order when he became a district judge in
2012.76 Thus, as of May 2017, six of the eleven active district judges in
the District of Massachusetts had adopted the order.77
To study the effect of the standing order, I used minute entries from the
Federal Judiciary’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”)
system. A minute entry includes an abundance of useful data like the
presiding judge, date of proceeding, proceeding type, proceeding
summary, and (most of the time) attorneys present. Here is an example
of a minute entry of a status conference that Judge Saylor held in a habeas
matter:
Case Number/Title
1:09-cv-12200-FDS
Mathews v. Roden

Dates

Category/
Event

Entered:
Category: minutes
01/14/2019 Event: Status Conference
16:46:12
Document: 86
Filed:
01/14/2019
Reopened:
09/20/2019

Docketed
by

Notes

L.
Pezzarossi
Type: crt

Cause: 28:2254
Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus
(State)
NOS:
Habeas
Corpus
(General)
Office: Boston
Presider: F.
Dennis Saylor,
IV
JuryF.demand:
Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge
Dennis None
Case
Flags:
Saylor, IV: Status Conference held on 1/14/2019. Case called. Colloquy re:
APPEAL
underlying matter in Barnstable. Court reviews the show cause
deadline.
No further status set at this time. COPY MAILED. (CourtHABEAS
Reporter: Lee
VI
Marzilli at leemarz@aol.com.)(Attorneys present: L. Mathews
(VC) E.
CT
Badway) (Pezzarossi, Lisa)
IM

The minute entries that report which lawyers were present allow for
tracking the experience levels of the lawyers appearing before the judges
in the District of Massachusetts. The first point of investigation was to
see if the adoption of the standing order had any immediate effect upon
the experience level of the lawyers appearing before the court. Collecting

75. Judge Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Mar. 15, 2017),
available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/sorokin.htm.
76. Judges Timothy S. Hillman & Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Court, for theDistrict
of Massachusetts, Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys
(Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/worcester/hillman.htm.
77. At the time, that represented half of the district judges. Judge George O’Toole, Jr. took
senior status on January 1, 2018, so now six of eleven district judges have adopted the standing order.
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data from when Judge Saylor adopted his first order in 2005 proved
difficult because the Federal Judiciary’s CM/ECF system was in its
infancy at that time. Minute entries from Judge Sorokin’s proceedings
were also unhelpful for my purposes because his docket entries generally
do not include which attorneys were present. And Judge Hillman has no
“before implementation” period because he has always used the order as
a district judge.
Now the good news. The minute entries for proceedings before Judges
Casper, Talwani, and Mastroianni for the six-month periods before and
after implementation of the standing orders were accessible, complete,
and useful. A review of the minute entries shows that Judges Casper and
Talwani generally conduct their own initial scheduling conferences.
Comparing who appeared at initial scheduling conferences before and
after implementation of the standing order makes sense for three primary
reasons. First, an initial scheduling conference is held in nearly every
case and is fairly routine.78So it is as close as possible to comparing apples
to apples. Second, the standing order expressly provides “scheduling
conferences” as an example of a “routine matter[]” that a more junior
lawyer could handle.79 Third, it is rare for dispositive issues to be
resolved at initial scheduling conferences so it is a proceeding that better
lends itself to allowing a more junior lawyer to appear. Said more bluntly,
it is a proceeding where a party or a more senior lawyer would be more
willing take a risk and send a less experienced attorney. For these reasons,
initial scheduling conferences seemed a like an appropriate proceeding to
analyze. I thus complied the data for the lawyers appearing at initial
scheduling conferences before Judges Casper and Talwani for six months
before and six months after each judge adopted the standing order.
Judge Mastroianni is different in that he does not conduct initial
scheduling conferences in his cases; he leaves that to the Magistrate Judge
assigned to the case. So I complied information about the lawyers
appearing before Judge Mastroianni in any civil proceeding for the sixmonth period before and the six-month period after implementation of the
standing order.
III. THE DATA
Two sets of data are analyzed below. The first shows the immediate
impact of the standing orders, and the second explores the orders’ longerterm effects.
78. See generally Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16 (permitting pretrial conference and requiring a
scheduling order in every case unless exempted)
79. Hillman & Sorokin, supra note 76 (“Such attorneys may handle not only relatively routine
matters (such as scheduling conferences or discovery motions) . . . “)
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A. Immediate Effects?: The Data Six Months Before and Six Months
After Implementation
To begin, I wanted to see if the standing order had any immediate
effects. Consequently, I investigated the six-month period before and the
six-month period after implementation for each judge.
1. Judge Casper Data: Six Months Before and After Implementation
Judge Casper adopted the standing order on May 16, 2011. During the
six months prior to implementation (December 20, 2010–May 15, 2011),
112 lawyers appeared before Judge Casper at initial scheduling
conferences. Through the use of state bar and firm websites, I was able
to determine when each lawyer who appeared before Judge Casper began
practicing law. In turn, I was able to calculate the experience level,
rounded to the closest year, of the lawyer appearing at the conference.
The mean experience level of lawyers appearing at initial scheduling
conferences before Judge Casper before implementation is 18.5893 years,
and the median is 17 years. The standard deviation is 11.5955.
I repeated these calculations for the six-month period after
implementation (May 16, 2011–November 16, 2019). During these six
months, there were 89 lawyer appearances at initial scheduling
conferences. The mean for this period is 19.2584 years of experience,
and the median is 18 years. The standard deviation is 11.7364.
Here is a bar-graph comparison of the two periods:

As demonstrated, the mean and median increased slightly. So, these
measurements do not show that experience level decreased before Judge
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Casper post implementation. To the contrary, those measurements
increased slightly. And the standard deviation remained roughly the
same, meaning that that spread changed little.
Based on those measurements, the standing order seemed to have no
effect in the direction of having more junior lawyers appear. But I also
wanted to see whether there was an increase in how often lawyers who
are in that “more junior” category were appearing. Foremost, I had to
define a more “junior lawyer” because the standing order does not. I
surveyed the orders across the country and, while there is some variation,
nearly all of the orders define a more junior lawyer as an attorney with
seven or fewer years of experience.80 I too used that definition.
Of the 112 lawyers who appeared at initial scheduling conferences
before implementation of the standing order, twenty of them had seven or
fewer years of experience. So 17.857% of the time, a “more junior”
lawyer appeared before Judge Casper. During the 89 proceedings postimplementation, a more junior lawyer appeared eighteen times. At
20.225%, this is a slight increase.
2. Judge Talwani Data: Six Months Before and After Implementation
I repeated the steps described above for Judge Talwani’s initial
scheduling conferences for the six-month pre-implementation period
(April 9, 2019–October 8, 2015) and the six-month post-implementation
period (October 9, 2015–March 9, 2019). The median, mean, and
standard deviation results were similar to Judge Casper’s. For the preimplementation period, the mean is 19.41379 years of experience; for the
six months after implementation, it is 18.8. As for the median, it went
from 20 to 18 years of experience. And the standard deviation stayed
80. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 7; ; Leigh Martin May, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil Litigation (Sept. 5, 2020), available at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/CVStandingOrderLMM.pdf; Miller, supra note 8;;
Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Order
(Jan. 18, 2017), available at https://nextgenlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Jr-LawyerOrder.pdf; Judge Michael J. McShane, United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
Opportunities
for
Young
Lawyers
(Aug.
7,
2020),
available
at
https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/court-info/our-judges/judge-mcshane; Judge Alfred H. Bennett,
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Court Procedures and Practices, available
at https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/Bennett.pdf (last visited Sept.30, 2020); Judge Richard W.
Story, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil
Litigation
(Mar.
1,
2017),
available
at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/RWS_Order_CV_Litigation.pdf; Judge Mark H. Cohen,
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil Litigation
(Sept. 5, 2018), available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/MHC_Standing_Order.pdf;
Gray Miller available at https://nextgenlawyers.com/files/Judge-Gary-Miller-Court-Procedures.pdf
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relatively consistent, going from 10.010 to 11.28661.
Here are the measurements shown graphically:

But again, I wanted to test the frequency with which “new lawyers”
were appearing. That measurement shows a more meaningful difference.
During the six months before implementation, there were 84 lawyer
appearances at scheduling conferences before Judge Talwani. Only ten
of those appearances were by more junior lawyers, for a percentage of
11.904%. During the post-implementation period, there were 177 lawyer
appearances at initial scheduling conferences, and 37 of them were made
by more junior lawyers. That means that a more junior lawyer appeared
20.90% of the time. The percentage nearly doubled.
3. Judge Mastrioanni Data: Six Months Before and After
Implementation
As explained, I analyzed the data for the experience level of lawyer
appearing before Judge Mastrioanni for all civil proceedings for the six
months before and after he adopted the standing order. There is the
concern that the proceedings during these two periods are dissimilar.
However, a review of the minute entries shows that, at least at a high level
of generality, they tended to be the same sorts of proceedings like
arguments on discovery matters and dispositive motions.
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As I predicted, the experience level of the lawyers appearing at these
proceedings was higher than at the initial scheduling conferences before
Judges Casper and Talwani. Before implementation, the mean was
23.12727 years of experience; for the six-month period after it was
22.22785. Pre-implementation the median was 23, and after it was 22
years. So neither the mean nor the median changed much. As for the
standard deviation, it changed slightly, increasing from 10.65672 years to
11.97672 years.

Judge Mastroianni: Experience Levels (in
years)
25
20
15
10
5

0
MEAN

MEDIAN

Before Standing Order

STDEV

After Standing Order

The final question for this data is whether it shows a change in how
often junior lawyers (seven years of experience or less) appear. Of the 55
lawyers who appeared before Judge Mastrioanni six months before the
implementation of the standing order, only three were “newer lawyers”—
for a percentage of 5.455. During the six months after implementation,
there were 79 lawyer appearances with six by newer lawyers. So, newer
lawyer appearances increased to 7.595%.
4. Summary of Data Six Months Before and Six Months After
Implementation
In sum, the data shows that the mean, median, and standard deviation
of attorney experience in years stayed relatively consistent during the sixmonth periods before and after implementation. But there appears to be
a slightly higher frequency of junior lawyer appearances before these
judges.
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B. Longer Term Effects: The Data from January 2019–June 2019
Given that any trend towards having a more junior lawyer appear was
mild, at best, just after implementation, I wanted to investigate next
whether two other factors could make a difference. The first is just the
passage of time. Additional time of course allows for more behavior
adjustment. This is so because counsel would need to become aware of
the standing order, manage client expectations, and adjust case staffing.
Second, by 2019, over half of the District Judges in the District of
Massachusetts had adopted the order. This coordination among judges
most likely increases the expressive powers of the order. Similarly, the
adoption of various orders encouraging new-lawyer participation across
the country have also enhanced the expressive force.81
81. Indeed, this movement is real. A very quick and very incomplete survey of just 20 federal
courts revealed that nearly 50 federal judges have adopted such orders. See Judge William Alsup, United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, Guidelines for Trial and Final Pretrial
Conference in Civil Jury Trials Before the Honorable William Alsup (May 8, 2017), available at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/alsup-wha/WHA-Standing-Order-forJuryTrials.pdf; Burke supra note 7; Judge Edward J. Davilla, Uited States District Court for the Northern
District of California, Standing Order for Civil Cases (May 3, 2019), available at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/davila-ejd/EJD_Civil-Standing-Order.pdf;
Donato supra note 47; Judge Yvonne Gonzales Rogers, United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, Standing Order in Civil Cases (Apr. 2, 2019), available at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/gonzalez-rogers-ygr/YGR-Standing-OrderCivil_Apr-2019.pdf; Judge Andrew J. Guilford, United States District Court for the Central District of
California,
Scheduling
Order
Specifying
Procedures,
available
at
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AG/AD/Scheduling%20Order%20Specifyin
g%20Procedures.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); Judge Lucy H. Koh, United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Guidelines for Final Pretrial Conferences in Jury Trials Before District
Judge Lucy H. Koh (Sept. 23, 2019), available at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wpcontent/uploads/judges/koh-lhk/Judge-Kohs-Standing-Order-for-Jury-Trials.pdf; Judge Barbara Lynn,
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Judge Specific Requirements, available at
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/chief-district-judge-barbara-lynn (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); May,
supra note 80 ; Miller supra note 8 ; Mitchell, supra note 80; Judge Kimberly J. Mueller, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California, Standing Orders, available at
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/judges/all-judges/5020/standing-orders; Judge Jon S.
Tigar, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Standing Order for Civil Jury
Trials Before District Judge Jon S. Tigar (Aug. 26, 2019),
available at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/tigar-jst/JST-Jury-Trial-Standing-Order.pdf;
Judge Barry Ted Moskowiz, United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Civil
Chamber
Rules
(Sept.
13,
2017),
available
at
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Judges/moskowitz/docs/Moskowitz%20Civil%20Chambers%20Rules.p
df; McShane, supra note 80; Bennett, supra note 80; Judge Travis McDonough, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Judicial Preferences, available at
https://www.tned.uscourts.gov/content/travis-r-mcdonough-united-states-district-judge; Story, supra
note 80 ;Cohen, supra note 80 ; Judge Timothy Batten, Sr., United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, Instructions to Parties and Counsel (Apr. 5, 2016), available at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/TCB_Instructions.pdf; Judge Ann Donnelly, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices and Rules (Oct. 11, 2016),
available at https://nextgenlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/AMD-MLR.pdf; Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Motion Practice
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of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JBW-MLR.pdf; Judge
Elizabeth A. Wolford, United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Junior Lawyers,
available at https://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/content/hon-elizabeth-wolford; Judge Lorna G. Schofield,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules and Procedures for
Civil
Cases
(Nov.
12,
2019),
available
at
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/LGS%20Individual%20Rules%20
Civil%20%28updated%2011.12.2019%29.pdf; Judge Cathy Seibel, United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Individual Practices for Judge Cathy Seibel (Sept. 4, 2018), available at
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/CS%20individual%20practices%2
0v9%20090418.pdf ; Judge Analisa Torres, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Individual Practices in Civil Cases for Analisa Torres (Nov. 13, 2019), available
at
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/AT%20Individual%20Practices%
20in%20Civil%20Cases%20-%20Final%2011.13.2019.pdf; Judge Kimba M. Wood, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules & Practices of the Hon. Kimba M.
Wood
(Mar.
11,
2019),
available
at
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/Individual%20Rules%20of%20Pr
actice%20-%20UPDATED%2003-11-19.pdf; Judge Gregory H. Woods, United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules of Practice in Civil Cases (Nov. 14, 2019), available
at
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/GHW%20Civil%20Practice%20R
ules%20November%2014%202019%20DRAFT.pdf; Judge Gene EK Pratter, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, General Pretrial and Trial Procedures (Jan. 2020), available at
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/prapol2.pdf; Judge Mark A. Kearney, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Policies and Procedure (Mar. 2020),
available at https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/keapol.pdf; Judge Michael Baylson,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge Baylson’s Pretrial and Trial
Procedures—Civil
Cases
(May
1,
2019),
available
at
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/baypol.pdf; Judge Pamela Chen, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practice and Rules (June 14, 2020),
available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/PKC-MLR.pdf; Judge Kiyo Mastumoto, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Chambers Practices (Sept. 24, 2020), available at
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/KAM-MLR.pdf; Judge Sanket Bulsara, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices of Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara, available
at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/SJB-MLR.pdf; Judge James Orenstein, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices of Magistrate Judge James Orenstein (Aug. 24,
2017), available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JO-MLR.pdf; Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Motion and Individual Practice Rules of
Magistrate
Judge
Ramon
E.
Reyes
(Sept.
30,
2020),
available
at
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/RER-MLR.pdf
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1. Judge Casper Data: January–June 2019
For the first six months of 2019, the mean experience level of the
lawyers appearing before Judge Casper at initial scheduling conferences
is 20.3167 years; the median is 17.5 years; and the standard deviation is
13.81725. This graph shows a comparison of the three periods:

Judge Casper: Experience Levels (in years)
25
20
15
10
5
0
MEAN
Before Standing Order

MEDIAN
STDEV
6 Months After Standing Order

January-June 2019

The graph shows that the mean and median changed little, but there
does seem to be a change in the standard deviation. It has increased,
which means there is a larger spread in 2019. But most interesting is that
for the first six months of 2019, there were 60 lawyer appearances at
initial scheduling conferences before Judge Casper. Seventeen of those
were junior lawyers. This means that 28.3% of the lawyers fit the bill.
Here is how this percentage increased for Judge Casper’s data:
SIX MONTHS
BEFORE
17.857%

SIX MONTHS
AFTER
20.225%

2019
28.3%

2. Judge Talwani Data: January–June 2019
The 2019 data for Judge Talwani shows that the mean is 23.03846
years; the median is 23 years, and the standard deviation is 12.41426:
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Judge Talwani: Experience Level (in years)
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STDEV

6 Months After Standing Order

January-June 2019

This is similar to Judge Casper’s data in that the mean and median
didn’t fluctuate too much—and even increased during the first six months
of 2019, but the standard deviation increased.
For this period, there were 52 lawyer appearances before Judge
Talwani, with seven of them being by junior lawyers. That is a percentage
of 13.46. Here are the percentages for the three periods:
SIX MONTHS
BEFORE
11.904%

SIX MONTHS
AFTER
20.09%

2019
13.46%

3. Judge Mastrioanni Data: January–June 2019
The data for Judge Mastrioanni shows the same trends. The mean and
median stayed relatively consistent, and the standard deviation increased.
Here are the changes shown graphically:
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There were 60 lawyer appearances in the first half of 2019. Twelve of
those appearances were by more junior lawyers. That means that 20% of
the time, more junior lawyers appeared.
SIX MONTHS
BEFORE
5.455%

SIX MONTHS
AFTER
7.595%

2019
20%

4. Summary of Data and Statistical Significance
The above graphs show a few consistent trends. First, the medians and
means changed little. But the standard deviations increased, as did the
percentage of junior lawyers appearing.
Therefore, I wanted to see how the probability of a junior lawyer
appearing before one of these judges changed from pre-implementation
to the first half of 2019. During the pre-implementation era, the combined
number of Rule 16 hearings for Judges Casper and Talwani and total
hearings before Judge Mastrioanni was 251. 82 At those hearings, a more
junior lawyer appeared thirty-three times, or roughly thirteen percent of
the time. During the first half of 2019, the judges held 172 relevant
hearings with junior lawyers appearing thirty-six times. That yields a
percentage of almost twenty-one. So the percentage increased.
But is this increase meaningful? Statistical significance helps quantify
whether a result is likely due to chance or to some other factor of interest.
Said differently, measuring the statistical significance helps us determine

82. Recall that Judge Casper and Judge Talwani had other hearings as well, but for purposes of
this analysis, only Rule 16 conferences are included.
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if the change is merely random.
To measure statistical significance, I calculated the z-score to compare
the frequency rate of junior lawyers appearing before implementation of
the orders to the frequency rate of such lawyers appearing in the first half
of 2019. A z-score measures a value’s relationship to the mean of a group
of values, measured in terms of standard deviations from the mean. Said
differently, the z-score tells you the position of an observation in relation
to the rest of its distribution.
Shown graphically, here is the relevant data:
Junior Lawyer
January–June
Before Implementation
Appearance?
2019
Yes
33
36
No
218
136
Total
251
172
Here, the z value is -2.1281, and the value p is .03318. Applying a .05
significance level, which is the generally accepted level, the changes are
in fact statistically significant, supporting the conclusion that the standing
order has at least partially disrupted the norm of not sending junior
lawyers to court. In other words, the increased frequency of junior lawyer
participation is not simply by chance.
V. CONCLUSION
What does all this mean? To start, the data shows that judges have
power aside from their ability to sanction. Again, to borrow from Cass
Sunstein, judges are “norm entrepreneurs”—but not only when they are
deciding questions of law or sanctioning parties. Their entrepreneurial
power extends beyond that. In this particular circumstance, I suspect that
the judicial standing orders provide cover to defect from the prevailing
norm of sending senior lawyers to court. Scholars have shown the same
was true in early American history when anti-dueling laws barred duelists
from elective office.83 Although it was gentlemanly to duel, it was also a
gentleman’s duty to serve as an elected official. So, says the gentleman,
I will not duel so I can serve a higher calling of public office. Likewise,
the one who decides whether to send a more junior lawyer to court has an
escape valve from the norm: the judge has expressed a desire for junior
lawyers to appear.
Some might say the judge’s ability to disrupt a norm is unsurprising
given the role judges play in society. But it is important to note that the
increase in junior lawyer participation has not been earthshattering. To
the contrary, even at Rule 16 conferences—where we might expect to see
83. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-73 (1995).
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more junior lawyers—the percentage never topped 29%. And while
Judge Talwani had a bump from just under 12% to over 20% during the
first sixth months of implementation, that petered out to only 13.46%
percent in 2019. In other words, simple expression of a judicial
preference does not turn the tide overnight.
Next, in implementing standing orders, judges can and should learn
from the literature on norms. This is so because the scholarship can teach
judges how to make their messaging more impactful—or less so if the
moment requires. The parallels between the scholarship on norms and
standing orders work because both occupy the nebulous space where there
is order but not law. As an example, judges could learn from Richard
McAdams’ work on esteem-based norms and the conditions necessary for
their occurrence.84 Generally, McAdams posits that consensus and
publicity are required for norm creation.85 The data above bears that out.
Over time, more judges adopted the junior-lawyer preference (increased
consensus) and presumably the bar grew increasingly aware of the
preference (increased publicity).
Consequently, there was more
compliance as consensus and publicity went up. Formulating consensus
and notifying the public also is consistent with the law. Supra II.
Interestingly, McAdams also identifies risk of detection as an important
feature of norm development. This is not an obvious aspect of the studied
standing order.86 But some judges employ a Notice of Argument by
Junior Lawyer.87 Such a notice would give counsel a sense that someone
is monitoring compliance—the feature that McAdams says matters.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial messaging via standing
orders deserves more attention and study. As the analysis above shows,
even a standing order that is not mandatory has an effect. This type of
study—and others that could be undertaken—has the ability to investigate
whether laws and rules impact behavior not merely because of threat of
sanction but because of their expressive powers. As for standing orders
that in fact threaten sanction for noncompliance, those, too, need
84. McAdams, supra note 11, at 358. In this article, McAdams offers the idea that, under the
right conditions, the desire for esteem produces a norm.
85. Id. at 358–59.
86. Of course a judge could review someone’s biography online or guess at a lawyer’s
experience level, but there is no immediate mechanism for detection. Indeed, with the studied standing
order, it’s arguably impossible to measure compliance because “junior lawyer” is not defined. This of
course is another way in which judges could enhance a standing order. Besides, lawyers generally like
clear instructions and rules.
87. See, e.g., Judge Sarah D. Morrison, United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Standing Order, Re: Civil Cases, Opportunities for Newer Attorneys (Oct. 18, 2019), available at
https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/standingordersJMorrison (“After a civil motion is fully briefed, any party
may forthwith alert the Court by a docketed Notice that, if oral argument is granted, the noticing party
intends to have a newer attorney (who has graduated from law school within the past six years) argue the
motion (or a portion of the motion).
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attention. For one thing, such study could show whether the addition of
a sanction is impactful to changing outcomes. More generally, studying
the power of judicial messaging complements our understanding of the
judicial role. And judges and society need to appreciate the aspects of
judicial power to assure that power is being used thoughtfully.
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